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California Workfare Legislation and the
Right of Privacy
Introduction
In 1985, the California Legislature passed a law authorizing the first
statewide workfare program,' designed to reduce the state's spiraling
welfare costs. The law, entitled Greater Avenues for Independence
(GAIN), requires recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) to participate in job search activities. If the recipients decline to
participate, their benefits will ultimately be terminated.
Federal and California law recognize that certain relationships and
activities deserve protection from governmental interference. The
United States and California Supreme Courts have held the right of pri-
vacy is a fundamental right. An important part of the right of privacy
protects parents' decisions on how to raise their children.
This Note questions the GAIN legislation's constitutionality, and
asserts that GAIN infringes on the right'of privacy of parents who re-
ceive AFDC benefits. This Note first examines the federal statutory au-
thority for GAIN and some of the shortcomings of prior programs under
similar legislation. It discusses the goals and mechanics of California's
GAIN program, provides a synopsis of both federal and California law
regarding the right of privacy within family relationships, and analyzes
GAIN's impact on AFDC recipients' privacy rights.
This Note concludes that the compulsory nature of GAIN requires
parents either to give up their right to choose how to raise their children,
or to lose their AFDC benefits. The state's interest is not "compelling"
enough to override the parents' fundamental right of privacy in child
rearing matters. This Note suggests an alternative solution to controlling
escalating welfare costs-a solution that does not intrude upon constitu-
tionally protected rights.
I. Federal Statutory Authority-"WIN"
A. Background of WIN
The Work Incentive Program (WIN) was enacted as part of the
1. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11320-11320.9 (West Supp. 1986). Although workfare
is only one component of California's program, see infra note 58, this type of legislation is
referred to as workfare for simplification.
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1967 amendments to Title IV of the Social Security Act.' The program
required that "appropriate" AFDC recipients who were at least sixteen
years old be referred by local welfare agencies to the Secretary of Labor
for participation in employment or job training.3 A recipient's refusal to
participate without good cause would result in his or her removal from
AFDC rolls.4
From the program's inception, criticism abounded.5 Critics claimed
that the work requirement for recipients created a family situation con-
trary to the purposes of the AFDC program.6  AFDC funds are
appropriated:
For the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent children in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State
to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other services,
as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to needy
dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they
are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help
such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maxi-
mum self-support and personal independence consistent with the
maintenance of continuing parental care and protection. . . .'
By taking the parents out of the home, and leaving the children alone or
in day care, WIN was viewed by critics as contrary to AFDC's purposes
of maintaining and strengthening family life.8
Additionally, welfare recipients viewed the WIN training programs
cynically;9 many recipients' experiences with past training programs re-
vealed that the programs were "unrealistic in terms of the employment
2. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, Title II § 204(b), amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (1964) (later amended Act of Dec. 28, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-223 §§ 3(a)(2)-(7); Act of
June 9, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, Title IV, §§ 401(a)-(f); Act of Aug. 13, 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, Title XXIII, §§ 2313(b), (c)(1), 2314; Act of July 18, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, Title
VI, §§ 2631, 2634(a), 2663 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a)(19), 630-645 (1986
Supp.)).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19)(A), 632(b) (1982). "Appropriate" recipients were those not
exempt from registration as specified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(19)(A)(i)-(viii) (1982), which in-
cludes: children under sixteen in school; elderly or ill recipients; recipients remote from a
work incentive project; parents of children under six; parents in a home with another adult
relative participating; and persons working more than thirty hours a week.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1982).
5. See, e.g., Note, Compulsory Work for Welfare Recipients Under the Social Security
Amendments of 1967, 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 197 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Compulsory Work]; Comment, Public Welfare "WIN" Program: Arm-Twisting Incentives, 117
U. PA. L. REV. 1062 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Public Welfare]; Comment, The
Failure of the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Failure of WIN].
6. See Comment, Failure of WIN, supra note 5, at 500.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
8. See, Comment, Failure of WIN, supra note 5, at 500.
9. Note, Compulsory Work, supra note 5, at 201.
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market and the needs and qualifications of the hard-core unemployed."' 0
Critics perceived WIN's compulsory nature as another drawback, for it
"retain[ed] a degrading aspect of recipiency for the poor person and pre-
clude[d] vital case-by-case analysis and assistance."" A high potential
for abuse existed under a compulsory system which coerced recipients to
work or lose their benefits.2 The program was believed to "intimidate
and compel recipients into working or training for work, rather than lur-
ing them into the job market. This could come about both overtly
through the sanctions for refusal to participate, and covertly by the myr-
iad of regulations and the possibilities of caseworkers exercising subtle
pressures upon recipients."' 3 One author envisioned a result resembling
the reemergence of the Elizabethan poor laws."'
The original WIN program did not set out the procedure for local
welfare agencies to follow in referring recipients to WIN.'" Many viewed
this as an additional drawback, even though hearing requirements for
other state-administered public assistance programs were apparently ap-
plicable to WIN referral hearings.16 If WIN recipients refused to work,
they were insured a hearing to determine if "good cause" existed for their
refusal. However, the statute was vague as to what constituted "good
cause", making it more difficult for the recipient to challenge the
agency's decision.' 7
One article summarized the criticisms of the WIN program:
Despite the early claim that WIN would provide a way for recipi-
ents to work their way off welfare by developing the skills neces-
sary to get and hold stable, better paying jobs, it has not worked
that way. Neither the WIN program nor any recent welfare re-
form proposal includes a job program equipped to prepare recipi-
ents for jobs in the primary labor market. Instead, the job
programs intended for welfare recipients are designed to enforce
the work requirement, forcing recipients into the secondary labor
market rather than training them for the primary. In sum, they
offer little hope of a stable, more prosperous alternative to welfare,
but instead attempt to substitute the unending cycle of job search
10. Id.
11. Id. at 213.
12. See id. at 208-09.
13. Comment, Public Welfare, supra note 5, at 1067.
14. Id. The Elizabethan poor law system provided that: (1) the poor receive direct relief
from funds collected by taxation; (2) poor houses be built for shelter; (3) employable poor be
put to work in manufacturing projects organized by overseers of the poor; (4) the able-bodied
who refused to work be sent to houses of correction; (5) poor children be put to work or
apprenticed; and (6) only those settled in the community were entitled to aid. tenBroek, Cali-
fornia's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN. L.
REv. 257, 258-91 (1964).
15. Comment, Public Welfare, supra note 5, at 1070.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1072-73.
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and short-term, low-wage work for the relative security of a wel-
fare check.18
B. The WIN Demo Program
In 1981, Congress enacted an alternative WIN program, entitled
Work Incentive Demonstration Program (WIN Demo).19 More than
half of the states have applied to operate a similar discretionary pro-
gram.20 California's GAIN program was instituted under WIN Demo.21
WIN Demo allows a state to "be free to design a program which
best addresses its individual needs, makes best use of its available re-
sources, and recognizes its labor market conditions." 22 The state is re-
stricted in its design only by the statement of objectives and the
description of implementation techniques set forth in its program plan.23
Examining the states' programs under WIN Demo gives a sampling
of the variations introduced. Arizona sought to expand WIN's
mandatory participant group to include recipients with children aged
three to five, if the recipients could arrange appropriate child care, and to
eliminate the exemption for remoteness,2 4 because it felt transportation
was the responsibility of the recipient. 25 Virginia and Pennsylvania re-
quire applicants and recipients of assistance to participate in WIN pro-
grams.26 Pennsylvania's plan delays an applicant's receipt of benefits
until the applicant has been "exposed" to the labor market;27 however,
this requirement's legality under federal statutes has been questioned.28
Many state WIN Demo plans are vague and uninformative as to the
exact activities participants must undergo. 9 Most states do not specify
how long a participant is expected to remain in any one phase of job-
seeking activity,3° which could frustrate a recipient trapped for too long
18. Zall & Betheil, The WIN Program: Implications for Welfare Reform and Jobs Or-
ganizing, 13 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 272, 281 (1979).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 645 (1982).
20. See, Martin-Leff, Survey of State WIN Demonstration Applications, 16 CLEARING-
HOUSE REV. 42 (1982).
21. Greater Avenues for Independence Act of 1985, ch. 1025, § 18, 1985 Cal. Legis. Serv.
10, 157 (West); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11310.5, 11347-11348.4 (West Supp. 1986). See
infra notes 36-100 and accompanying text.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 645(c) (1982).
23. Id.
24. An individual is not required to register for WIN if that individual is "so remote from
a work incentive project that his effective participation is precluded." 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(19)(A)(iii) (1982).




29. Id. However, Virginia and Nebraska contain a relatively clear description of job
search and training requirements, respectively. Id. at 42-43.
30. Id. at 43.
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in one stage. For example, without any time limits, a participant could
be placed in a workfare component indefinitely, which would not free the
participant from welfare. Additionally, a participant could be relegated
to job search activities without end, and without an evaluation of his or
her progress, or the need for more training. Frustration of AFDC recipi-
ents could lead to feelings of helplessness and disgust with the system-
something WIN is supposed to prevent.31
California's legislation was designed to address the shortcomings of
other states' programs instituted under WIN Demo.32 The legislation's
authors visited programs in three Eastern states and discovered welfare
recipients, placed in "dead end" jobs, who were supposedly being trained
for more skilled positions.3 3 For example, in a water-testing laboratory
in West Virginia, the legislators met a 38 year-old woman named Velda,
who had four children and whose husband was in jail. Although sup-
posedly learning how to be a water-tester, she was receiving little training
and was being used as a janitor.34 The legislators agreed that California's
program should insure this problem would not occur.3 5
II. California's WIN Demo-The Greater Avenues for
Independence Act of 1985
A. Goals
California asserts that the goals of GAIN are to: (1) give a welfare
recipient the opportunity to prepare for a private, unsubsidized job, re-
sulting in his or her permanent removal from welfare rolls; 36 (2) save the
state money through reduced welfare costs; 37 (3) increase state revenues
31. It is expected that the individuals participating in the program established under
this part will acquire a sense of dignity, self-worth, and confidence which will flow
from being recognized as a wage-earning member of society and that the example of
a working adult in these families will have beneficial effects on the children in such
families.
42 U.S.C. § 630 (1982).
32. Kirp, How Workfare Became Law-An Amazing Compromise, The Sacramento Bee,




36. Legislative pamphlet, Highlights of GAIN, at I (available through California Assem-
blyman Art Agnos) [hereinafter cited as Highlights of GAIN].
37. Id. See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § I1320.2(d)(2) (West Supp. 1986). The
Department of Social Services (DSS) estimates that California will save approximately $250
million a year in reduced welfare costs; yet the Legislative Analyst's office pointed out "Itihat
DSS probably exaggerated the speed with which welfare recipients will get jobs and overstated
the savings from those who, in order to avoid workfare, won't sign up for welfare in the first
place." Kirp, supra note 32. If this is so, GAIN's actual costs could be higher, and its fiscal
benefits smaller, than projected. Id.
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by creating more taxpayers;"8 (4) give welfare recipients the opportunity
to participate in the decisions that affect their preparation for private
employment;39 (5) give recipients the opportunity to educate, train and
prepare for a job that is not a "dead end";4' and (6) integrate work into
welfare so as to give welfare new legitimacy with the recipients and with
the public.41
B. Mechanics of GAIN
Under the GAIN legislation, all able-bodied applicants and recipi-
ents of aid are required to register with the county welfare department.42
A parent with primary responsibility for the care of a child under six
years of age is not required to register.43 Those persons exempt from
registration may volunteer.4 Persons who are required to register may
defer participation under special circumstances.45 Each registrant must
enter into a written contract with the county social services department
after being given only three days to consider and evaluate the terms of
38. Highlights of GAIN, supra note 36, at 1. These increased tax revenues are questiona-
ble given the low tax bracket in which most former recipients are likely to fall.
39. Id. See also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320(f)(1) (West Supp. 1986). The legis-
lative pamphlet specifically states that the recipients are expected to participate without assist-
ance from a lawyer or welfare rights advocate (see supra note 36, at I), which means AFDC
recipients may not be protected from many potential abuses under the untested GAIN pro-
gram.
For example, there are no provisions in the legislation for sanctions against a county for
failing to meet the conditions of an assessment contract. In fact, counties are permitted to
ignore the contract provisions if services are unavailable. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11320.5(d) (West Supp. 1986). There is little to prevent a county from breaching an assess-
ment contract, especially when the contract requires the county to provide costly services to
the AFDC recipient, since the county and its workers may go unpunished. It is up to the
recipient to complain about a breach, and few welfare recipients will report breached contracts
because they risk alienating the county workers who have the authority to cut off their AFDC
benefits.
In addition, only the recipient is allowed to consider and evaluate the terms of the con-
tract (see infra note 46): he or she is not allowed to take it home or show a copy to a legal
representative. This aspect of the assessment contract resembles an adhesion contract. See
generally, A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559C (C. Kaufman ed. 1984 Supp.).
Moreover, if the recipient does complain about a breached contract, the grievance proce-
dure may be formulated by the county accused of breaching the contract. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 11320.65 (West Supp. 1986). Without trained legal assistance, the recipient will
probably not know whether he or she received due process.
40. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.65 (West Supp. 1986). See also, supra notes 32-35
and accompanying text.
41. Highlights of GAIN, supra note 36. Supposedly, GAIN will put welfare on the same
basis as unemployment benefits in terms of public assistance and support. Id.
42. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11320.1, 11320.5(a) (West Supp. 1986).
43. Id. at §§ 11320.1, 11310(b)(6).
44. Id.
45. Id. at § 11320.5(a). The statute provides:
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the contract.46 The contract must explain the program, describe the
services the county will provide, outline the registrant's duties and
responsiblities, and detail the consequences to a registrant for refusing to
participate.47
Registrants who have worked in the past two years can choose be-
tween a three-week "job club' 48 or a three-week supervised job search.49
Registrants who have not worked in the past two years must participate
in a three-week job club.5 0 Those registrants who lack basic literacy or
mathematics skills, a high school diploma, or English language skills
must be referred to appropriate education programs." Those partici-
pants who are unsuccessful during job club, job search, or those who
have been on and off AFDC more than twice in the past three years, are
referred directly to assessment. 2
Unless otherwise exempt, all of the following persons shall not be required to partici-
pate in program components, beyond registration, until the county welfare depart-
ment determines that the situation not requiring participation no longer exists:
(1) A caretaker relative who is enrolled in school for at least 12 units of credit
and has a child under age six.
(2) A person who is so seriously dependent upon alcohol or drugs that work
or training is precluded.
(3) A person who is having an emotional or mental problem that precludes
participation.
(4) A person who is involved in legal difficulties, such as court-maintained
appearances, which preclude participation.
(5) A person who does not have the legal right to work in the United States.
(6) A person who has a severe family crisis.
(7) A person who is in good standing in a union which controls referrals and
hiring in the occupation.
(8) A person who is temporarily laid off from a job with a definite call-back
date.
(9) A person who is employed for 15 or more hours per week.
(10) A person, or a family member, who has a medically verified illness.
Id.
46. Id. at § 11320.5(b).
47. Id. at § I1320.5(b)(1)(A)-(C).
48. A "job club" includes both job search workshops and supervised job search. Job
search workshops consist of "group training sessions where participants learn various job find-
ing skills, including training in basic job seeking skills, job development skills, job interviewing
skills, understanding employer requirements and expectations, and how to enhance self-es-
teem, self-image, and confidence." Id. at § 11320.3(c)(1)(A). A supervised job search
includes:
[A]ccess to phone banks in a clean and well-lighted place, job orders, direct referrals
to employers, or other organized methods of seeking work which are overseen, re-
viewed, and criticized by a trained employment professional. The amount and type
of activity required during this supervised job search period shall be determined by
the county and the participant, based on the participant's employment history and
need for supportive services, and shall be consistent with regulations developed by
the department.
Id. at § 11320.3(c)(1)(B).
49. Id. at § 11320.5(b)(3).
50. Id. at § 1 1320.5(b)(2).
51. Id. at § 11320.5(b)(6).
52. Id. at § 11320.5(c).
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Assessment entails the development of an employment plan between
the participant and the county welfare department.13 The plan must in-
clude an evaluation of the participant's skills and needs.5" Based on this
assessment, training or education decisions are made. The original con-
tract is then amended to reflect the selections and performance criteria
formulated during assessment. The amended contract must also specify
the supportive services to be provided to the participant-for example,
child care or transportation." Once training or education has begun, the
participant has thirty days in which to request a change or reassign-
ment.5 6 Any participant who completes the training or education serv-
ices, but remains unemployed, is referred to job search services for ninety
days.5 If the participant remains unemployed at the end of this ninety-
day job search period, he or she is evaluated and reassigned to an ad-
vanced long-term preemployment preparation (PREP) assignment.58 If
53. Id.
54. Id. This assessment must include at least all of the following:
(I) The participant's work history, including an inventory of his or her em-
ployment skills, knowledge and abilities.
(2) The participant's educational history and present educational competency
level.
(3) The participant's need for supportive services in order to obtain the great-
est benefit from the employment and training services offered under this article.
(4) The employment goals of the participant, and an evaluation of the chances
for the achievement of these goals given the current potential skills of the participant
and the local labor market conditions.
(5) A goal to be attained upon completion of the program, including the pe-
riod of time it will take to achieve this goal, and the resources available under this
program for the attainment of that goal. This assessment shall be done by a person
qualified by education or experience to provide counseling, guidance, assessment, or
career planning. The county may contract with outside parties, including local edu-
cational agencies and service delivery areas to provide the assessment required by
this subdivision.
Id. at § 11320.5(c)(1)-(5).
55. Id. at § 11320.5(d).
56. Id.
57. Id. See supra note 48.
58. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.5(d) (West Supp. 1986). See also id. at
§ 11320.3(d)(2)(B). This "preemployment preparation assignment" is the component com-
monly referred to as "workfare", i.e., working off the AFDC grant in public service positions.
The statute reads:
Preemployment preparation shall be work for a public or nonprofit agency that pro-
vides the participant with either of the following:
(A) Basicpreemployment preparation, which shall provide work behavior skills
and a reference for future unsubsidized employment.
(B) Advanced preemployment preparation, which shall provide on-the-job en-
hancement of existing participant skills in a position related to a participant's experi-
ence, training, or education acquired as a result of services funded pursuant to a
contract entered into pursuant to Section 11320.5.
A short-term preemploymentpreparation assignment shall be for not longer than
three months, and may be provided as a preparation for other education and training
services as a part of the contract amendments pursuant to subdivisions (d) and (e) of
Section 11320.5. A long-term preemployment preparation assignment shall not ex-
ceed one year. The number of hours a person participates in a preemployment prepa-
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at any time a participant does not meet the required criteria for success-
ful completion of the assigned training or education services, the partici-
pant will be reassigned to a basic long-term PREP assignment.5 9 The
assignment to basic or advanced long-term PREP must be reviewed by
the county at least once every six months to insure conformity to the
contract and ascertain the likelihood that the program will lead to unsub-
sidized employment .6  At the end of the one-year limitation on long-
term PREP, the employment plan must be reviewed, and, using the pro-
cedure described for assessment, 61 the plan must be revised if necessary
to obtain the goal of unsubsidized employment for the participant.62
Controversies concerning proposed activities are referred to arbitra-
tion, which is binding upon both the county and the participant. The
arbitrator must be an impartial third party, with career planning experi-
ence and no financial or other interest in the result of the assessment.63
Various job services may be included in the participant's employ-
ment plan. In addition to the previously mentioned job club,64 a partici-
pant may choose from an unsupervised job search,6" job placement,66 job
development,67 and employment counseling program.68 Training and ed-
ucation services include job training,69 preemployment preparation
(PREP),70 adult basic education,71 college and community college educa-
ration program shall be determined by adding his or her aid grant under this chapter,
less any child support paid to the county, and his or her food stamp allotment and
dividing by the average hourly wage for all job orders placed with the Employment
Development Department. The average hourly wage shall be updated annually every
July 1. No preemployment preparation assignment shall exceed 32 hours per week.
Id. at § 11320.3(d)(2) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at § 11320.5(d).
60. Id. This part of the statute specifically addresses the problems found in other states'
programs. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 54.
62. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.5(d) (West Supp. 1986).
63. Id. at § 11320.5(e). However, the arbitrator is chosen and paid by the county. Id.
64. See supra note 48.
65. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.3(c)(2) (West Supp. 1986). This activity involves
the individual seeking work in his or her own way and making progress reports at least every
two weeks to the county welfare department.
66. Id. at § 11320.3(c)(3). Job placement includes referrals to jobs listed by employers
with the State Job Service.
67. Id. at § 11320.3(c)(4). Job development gives the participant active assistance in seek-
ing employment by a trained employment professional on a one-to-one basis.
68. Id. at § 11320.3(c)(5). Counseling is "aimed at helping a person reach an informed
decision on an appropriate employment goal." Id.
69. Id. at § 1 1320.3(d)(1). Job training includes "training in employer-specific job skills
in a classroom or onsite setting, including training provided by local private industry council
programs and community colleges." Id.
70. Id. at § 11320.3(d)(2). See supra note 58.
71. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.3(d)(3)(West Supp. 1986). Adult basic education
includes "reading, writing, and arithmetic necessary for employment or job training, including
high school proficiency." Id.
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tion,72 vocational instruction in English as a second language,73 grant
diversion,74 supported work, and transitional employment. Priority in
receiving services which are either expensive, lengthy, or both is given to
persons who have received aid for at least two years or who have little or
no employment history.76 Less costly services and short-term services
are provided to recipients of aid for less than two years, unless it is deter-
mined that these types of services would not be effective in helping the
recipient obtain unsubsidized employment.7 7 If services to be provided
under the contract are not immediately available to the participant, he or
she is required to participate in job search activities until such services
become available.78
GAIN's authors attempted to prevent the displacement of the cur-
rent workforce by restricting the types of positions the employment and
training program participants and PREP assignees may fill. 79 These pro-
grams may not (1) displace current employees or undercut any overtime
currently worked; (2) fill "established unfilled positions";8" (3) fill posi-
tions which would otherwise be promotional opportunities for current
employees; (4) fill positions prior to compliance with applicable person-
nel procedures or collective bargaining provisions; (5) fill positions cre-
ated by termination, layoff, or reduction in workforce; or (6) create
positions as a result of strike, lockout, or other bona fide labor dispute or
72. Id. at § 11320.3(d)(4). College education is only provided when it "provides sufficient
employment skills training that can reasonably be expected to lead to employment." Id. A
person already enrolled in a vocational training or educational program may continue to par-
ticipate for a maximum of only two academic years. Id. at § 11320.5(b)(5).
73. Id. at § 11320.3(d)(5). This is intensive English instruction for non-English speaking
participants, coordinated with specific job training. Id.
74. Id. at § 11320.3(d)(6). Grant diversion means "public or private sector employment
or on-the-job training at comparable wage rates, in which the recipient's cash grant, or a por-
tion thereof, or the welfare grant savings from employment, is diverted to the employer as a
wage subsidy." Id. at § 11320.3(d)(8).
75. Id. at § 11320.3(d)(7)-(8). Supported work and transitional employment mean "a
form of grant diversion in which the recipient's cash grant, or a portion thereof, or the welfare
grant savings from employment, is diverted to an intermediary service provider." Id.
Under grant diversion, supported work, and transitional employment projects, a recipient
must not receive less income than if he or she had not participated in the project. All employ-
ers receiving county funds must agree not to discriminate against participants in race, sex,
national origin, age, or disability. Id.
76. Id. at § 11320.4(b).
77. Id. at § 11320.4(c).
78. Id. at § 11320.5(d). For a discussion of the possible implications of this provision, see
supra note 39.
79. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11320.35, 11320.38 (West Supp. 1986).
80. "Established unfilled positions" are those positions that have already been created and
occupied, but are temporarily vacant due to the employee leaving, retiring, dying, or being
fired. However, the positions may be filled if they are unfunded in a public agency budget.
This exception is only applicable to PREP positions. Id. at § 11320.35(b).
violation of any existing collective bargaining agreement.81
These broad restrictions, designed to protect the current workforce,
could effectively shut out GAIN participants from meaningful employ-
ment. The legislature did not include any provisions in GAIN to create
new jobs, and the primary labor market will not necessarily expand to
accomodate GAIN participants.
C. Sanctions for Non-Participation
Sanctions are imposed if recipients fail or refuse to participate in an
assigned component without good cause.82 Yet they may not be imposed
before informal and formal efforts at resolution and a good cause deter-
mination are undertaken.83 The statute provides grounds which consti-
tute "good cause", including: employment or training which is not
within the scope of the contractual employment plan," requires a travel
period in excess of two hours round trip,85 or involves conditions violat-
ing health and safety standards;86 a breakdown in transportation ar-
rangements; 87 failure to receive supportive services agreed to under the
contract;88 or employment at a wage level that results in a net loss of
income to the recipient.89
Once formal conciliation efforts have failed, those recipients who fail
or refuse to comply are placed on money management (Le., vendor and
third party payments) by the County Welfare Department for three
months.9" Aid is reinstated and money management discontinued if re-
cipients agree to participate in the GAIN program during the three-
month sanction period. 91 If a person still refuses to participate after the
three-month money management period, or it is the second time the per-
son has failed to cooperate, aid is reduced or terminated for three or six
months. 92
81. Id. at § 11320.35, 11320.38.
82. Id. at § 11320.6(a).
83. Id. The County Welfare Department must develop regulations specifying the maxi-
mum length of time allowed for informal conciliation efforts. Id. Formal conciliation efforts
are to be conducted in accordance with § 5302 of the California Unemployment Insurance
Code, or a procedure established by the county pursuant to § 11320.2 of the California Welfare
and Institutions Code. Id. at § 11320.65.
84. Id. at § 11320.7(a)(8).
85. Id. at § 11320.7(a)(3).
86. Id. at § 11320.7(a)(5).
87. Id. at § 11320.7(f).
88. Id. at § 11320.7(a)(11).
89. Id. at § 11320.7(a)(13). Numerous other grounds are also enumerated in the statute.
Id. at § 11320.7(a)(l)-(13), (b)().
90. Id. at § 11320.6(b). Vendor and third party payments are payments, for items of sup-
port to the child, made directly to vendors by the County Welfare Department. Id. at § 11454.
91. Id. at § 11320.6(b).
92. Id. at § 11320.6(b)(l)-(3). If the individual who refuses to participate is a caretaker
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Counties are required to establish formal grievance procedures,
93
which participants may invoke any time they believe a program require-
ment or assignment violates their contract or is inconsistent with the
GAIN Act. 94 Participants dissatisfied with the outcome of the grievance
procedure may appeal the decision.95 Sanctions are not imposed during
the grievance procedure as long as the recipient continues to participate
in the program pending the outcome of the process. 9 6 By requiring
AFDC recipients to maintain participation in GAIN while invoking the
grievance procedures, counties may unnecessarily cause a difficult situa-
tion for participants with good cause not to continue. Some grounds for
failing to participate make it impossible for the recipient to continue par-
ticipation pending the outcome of the grievance procedure.
97
Gain is a compulsory program because sanctions are imposed for
non-compliance. As a result of this compulsory aspect, certain constitu-
tional issues are raised. All GAIN participants are parents of minor chil-
dren, and therefore day care is required to take care of participants'
younger children while the parents are meeting GAIN's requirements.98
Older children are left alone while their parents are out. The day care
issue raises constitutional questions concerning parents' right of privacy
in raising their children.
caretaker relative. If the parent who is the principal wage earner makes the refusal, assistance
to the family is terminated.
These sanctions are incurred for three months if it is the first occurrence. For each subse-
quent occurrence, the sanctions are assessed for six months. Id. at § 11305(a)-(b).




97. See generally, supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text. For example, a recipient has
good cause for refusing to continue if the employment or training involves conditions violating
health and safety standards. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Requiring a recipient
to continue participating in this situation pending the outcome of a grievance procedure could
endanger his or her life or health. Also, a recipient has good cause for refusing to continue if
supportive services under the contract are not provided. See supra note 88 and accompanying
text. A recipient who fails to receive child care services would have to choose between leaving
the child alone or losing the benefits by failing to participate in GAIN pending the outcome of
the grievance procedure. A recipient whose transportation arrangements break down also has
good cause not to participate. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. However, the re-
quirement to continue participating during the grievance procedure runs counter to the impos-
sibility of doing so when there is no transportation.
98. The California Legislature passed the GAIN Legislation as part of a compromise
which included a bill authorizing a $22.5 million expenditure for extended day care services to
GAIN participants' school age children. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 8460-8492 (West Supp. 1986).
The bill also included day care funding for low income, non-GAIN participants. Id. at
§ 8468.5(b)(1)(B). The bill's authors estimated that between 50,000 to 90,000 additional chil-
dren will require day care because of the GAIN requirements. Legislative Pamphlet, Overview
of SB 303, at 3 (available through California Senator David Roberti) [hereinafter cited as Over-
view of SB 303].
III. Privacy Within Family Relationships
A. Federal Law
Since the early years of this century, the United States Supreme
Court has recognized that certain family relationships deserve protection
against unwarranted intrusion by the state. The freedom to rear one's
children is one such highly protected right. Two early cases, based on
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty through the Due Pro-
cess Clause,99 laid the foundation for the right of parents to direct their
childrens upbringing.
In Meyer v. Nebraska,"° a parochial school teacher was convicted of
violating a Nebraska statute which forbade the teaching of school chil-
dren in any non-English language. The law was invalidated by the
Supreme Court as an invasion of the liberty guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment.1 ' In reaching its decision, the Court expanded its
view of individual liberty to encompass not only the right to be free from
physical confinement, but also the right to establish a home and bring up
children."12
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,°3 an Oregon law requiring mandatory
public school attendance was challenged by the Society of Sisters, an Or-
egon corporation, organized to educate and care for orphans according
to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church."° The Oregon statute re-
quired that children be sent to public schools, thus outlawing any in-
struction by private organizations. The Court ruled that such a statute
"unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control."105
These decisions were based on the doctrine of "substantive due pro-
cess." This doctrine grew out of the concept that a higher or natural law
limits the government's ability to restrain individual liberty. The
Supreme Court has on occasion suggested that under substantive due
process analysis, it has an inherent right to review the substance of state
or federal legislation. 16 The substantive due process doctrinie was widely
accepted until 1937,107 when the Supreme Court shifted its focus from a
substantive due process, to an equal protection analysis, in its evaluation
99. The Due Process Clause provides that "no state shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. ". U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
101. Id. at 399-400.
102. Id. at 399.
103. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
104. Id. at 531-32.
105. Id. at 534-35.
106. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 331-32 (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK].
107. Id. at 342-43.
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of governmental regulation and fundamental rights cases. However, one
area where both substantive due process and equal protection analysis
have been applied, is the "right of privacy."' 8 Meyer and Pierce were
important to the growth of a constitutional right of privacy, and both
cases show a historical recognition that inherent in the concept of liberty
is the right to private decision-making regarding family matters.109
More recently, the Court has chosen to protect fundamental rights
such as child rearing through its interpretation of the Constitution's
guarantee of a right of privacy.11° The right of privacy was first dis-
cussed in Griswold v. Connecticut,"' which overturned a state law pro-
scribing the use of contraceptives. The appellants in Griswold, a doctor
and a Planned Parenthood League executive, had been convicted for giv-
ing information and medical advice to married persons concerning con-
traception, and for prescribing a contraceptive device.' 2 The Court held
that the law impermissibly limited the right of privacy of married per-
sons, and violated the Due Process Clause by depriving married persons
of the liberty protected by the fundamental right of privacy. 1 3 Justice
Douglas, in the majority opinion, attempted to relate the right of privacy
to constitutional guarantees, since the Court continued to formally reject
the substantive due process decisions of the early part of the century." 4
The Court found that the right of privacy emanates from several guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights, but that the right is not based on a specific
constitutional provision:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance.... Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The
right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amend-
ment is one [such zone of privacy] .... The Third Amendment in
its prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The Fifth
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to
surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
108. Id. at 351.
109. Id. at 685.
110. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
111. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
112. Id. at 480.
113. Id. at 481-86.




Based on Justice Douglas' analysis, the right of privacy was created in
Griswold.
The Griswold Court cited Meyer and Pierce to show that the zones of
privacy encompassed the fundamental right of parents in rearing their
children. 1 6 The individual's right to freedom of choice in marriage and
family relationship lies at the heart of the right of privacy.
117
In his concurrence in Griswold, Justice Goldberg more clearly de-
scribed the rule of law surrounding the zones of privacy. He stated that
the Court has never held that the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth
Amendment protects only those rights specifically mentioned by name in
the Constitution." 8 He also outlined the state's burden in justifying an
intrusion in a protected area. Fundamental personal liberties may not be
abridged by states simply upon a showing that a regulatory statute has
some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose:"
9
"Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is
compelling."'2 0 The law must be shown to be "necessary, and not
merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy."' 2 ' Legislation impinging on constitutionally protected areas
also must be narrowly drawn and not of an "unlimited and indiscrimi-
nate sweep."'
22
In Roe v. Wade,'23 the zone of privacy announced in Griswold was
further particularized as created within the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, the Ninth Amendment, and the concept of liberty in the Four-
teenth Amendment. 24 In overturning a state law prohibiting abortion,
the Court stated that only personal rights that are deemed "fundamen-
tal" are included in the guarantee of personal privacy.'2 5 This privacy
115. 381 U.S. at 484.
116. Id. at 482.
117. NOWAK, supra note 108, at 689. See also, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844
(1986).
118. 381 U.S. 479, 486 n.1 (1965).
119. Id. at 497.
120. Id. (quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)). Bates involved city ordi-
nances which required the NAACP to supply city officials with the names of its members. The
Court held that disclosure would interfere with the members' freedom of association, which is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
121. Id. (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)). In McLaughlin, the
Court overturned a Florida statute which prohibited an unmarried interracial couple from
habitually living in and occupying the same room at night. As no other statute prohibited the
same conduct by members of the same race, the Court held the statute violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth.Amendment.
122. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 490 (1960).
123. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
124. Id. at 152.
125. Id. See also, Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986).
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right was found to encompass "child rearing."' 126 In his concurrence in
Roe v. Wade, Justice Stewart announced that Griswold was previously
decided under the doctrine of substantive due process, and that this un-
derlies the right of privacy.127
In Carey v. Population Services International,128 the Court cited Roe
v. Wade in striking down a state law prohibiting the sale of non-prescrip-
tion contraceptives to minors. The Court stated that "[a]lthough '[t]he
Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy,'.., one
aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is 'a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of cer-
tain areas or zones of privacy.' ",129
Recently, in Bowers v. Hardwick, 1 0 the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy. The Court distinguished the established line of right
of privacy cases, stating that there is no connection between privacy
within family relations, marriage, and procreation, and privacy of homo-
sexual activity. Thus, while declining to extend the right of privacy, the
Court nonetheless reafirmed the right in the area of traditional family
relations.1
31
The privacy right is not absolute. At some point the state's interest
becomes so compelling as to justify regulation by the state.132 But where
certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has applied the "strict
scrutiny" test: regulations limiting these rights must be narrowly
drawn,13 3 and may be justified only by a "compelling state interest."
134
B. California Law
In California, the right of privacy is not inferred from "penumbras"
or "zones," but is explicitly guaranteed by Article I, § 1 of the California
Constitution: "All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and lib-
erty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. '
126. 410 U.S. at 153.
127. Id. at 167.
128. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
129. Id. at 684.
130. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
131. Id. at 2843-44.
132. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
133. See supra note 120.
134. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963)).
135. CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 1 (West Supp. 1986).
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Child rearing is also a fundamental right under California law, and
the California courts have followed the federal law regarding the scope of
the privacy right. In In re Marriage of Wellman," 6 the California Court
of Appeals emphasized "that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents .... ",,'3 In that case, the trial court, in a
dissolution proceeding, ordered a wife to have no overnight visits in her
children's presence with a man to whom she was not married. 138- The
appellate court held that this order intruded on the mother's right of
privacy and right to freely associate with others. 139 The court stated:
"[Constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the par-
ents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of
their children is basic in the structure of our society.""' In Crain v.
Krehbiel,'4' a federal court, interpreting California law, held that state
constitutional protection of individual autonomy is generally limited to
matters relating to, among other things, marriage and child rearing. 42
In Perez v. City of San Bruno,'43 the California Supreme Court
stated the test to determine whether a law unconstitutionally restricts a
fundamental right, such as child rearing: "When rights of such funda-
mental nature are involved, 'regulation limiting these rights may be justi-
fied only by a "compelling state interest," . . . and . . . legislative
enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state
interests at stake.' "14 This is the same test used by the United States
Supreme Court.
1 45
C. Welfare and the Right of Privacy
Under federal law, the receipt of welfare benefits is not a fundamen-
tal right.146 However, the protection of constitutional rights may not be
made to turn upon whether a governmental benefit is a "right" or a
136. 104 Cal. App. 3d 992, 164 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1980).
137. Id. at 996, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
138. Id. at 994, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
139. Id. at 999, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
140. Id. at 996, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 150 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639
(1968)). See also, People v. Thomas, 159 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal. Rptr. 84 (Cal. App.
Dept. Super. Ct. 1984) (statute requiring child seat restraints does not infringe on parent's
fundamental right of privacy).
141. 443 F. Supp. 202 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
142. Id. at 208.
143. 27 Cal. 3d 875, 616 P.2d 1287, 168 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1980).
144. Id. at 890 n.11, 616 P.2d at 1995 n.11, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 122 n.11 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. at 155).
145. See supra notes 110-130 and accompanying text.
146. Krislov, The OEO Lawyers Fail to Constitutionalize Right to Welfare: A Study in the
Uses and Limits of the Judicial Process, 8 MINN. L. REv. 211, 228-29 (1973), citing Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). In Dandridge, the Court stated:
[Here we deal with state regulation in the social and economic field, not affect-
ing freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and claimed to violate the Fourteenth
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"privilege."14 7 "Unconstitutional conditions cannot be attached to the
receipt of benefits in such a way that the recipient of the benefit is forced
to choose between the benefit and relinquishment of a constitutional
right."14 Therefore, welfare recipients do not waive their right to seek
redress of a violation of their constitutional rights, merely because their
receipt of aid is based on government "largesse." '149
Welfare recipients' rights to privacy were upheld by the California
Supreme Court in Parrish v. Civil Service Commission,15 0 which held that
unannounced dawn searches of county welfare recipients' homes was an
unconstitutional deprivation of privacy. 51
Since welfare recipients do not forfeit their constitutional rights in
return for benefits, they may challenge the GAIN legislation if it in-
fringes on their right of privacy.
IV. GAIN's Impact on Privacy Rights
By definition, AFDC recipients are parents of minor children.
15 2
Under the GAIN legislation, AFDC recipients are required to partici-
pate in job search and job training activities outside of the home or risk
losing their benefits.1 53 While seeking employment or job training, par-
ents are compelled to place their children aged six to eleven in child care,
and older children are often left alone at home.1 54 In two-parent families
on AFDC, only one parent is required to seek work. 55 By requiring
only one parent to seek employment and by allowing the other parent to
remain in the home with a child under six, the state has thus recognized
Amendment only because the regulation results in some disparity in grants of welfare
payments to the largest AFDC families....
To be sure, the cases cited [requiring only the "reasonable basis" test of Due
Process], and many others enunciating this fundamental standard under the Equal
Protection Clause, have in the main involved state regulation of business or industry.
The administration of public welfare assistance, by contrast, involves the most basic
economic needs of impoverished human beings. We recognize the dramatically real
factual difference between the cited cases and this one, but we can find no basis for
applying a different constitutional standard.
Id. at 484-85.
147. Rafaelli v. Comm. of Bar Examiners, 7 Cal. 3d 288, 300, 496 P.2d 1264, 1272, 101
Cal. Rptr. 896, 904 (1972) (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1972)).
148. Note, Social Welfare-An Emerging Doctrine of Statutory Entitlement, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 603, 617 (1969) (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958), and Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405 (1963)) [hereinafter cited as Note, Social Welfare]. See also, Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595, 1599-1602 (1960).
149. Note, Social Welfare, supra note 144, at 609.
150. 66 Cal. 2d 260, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
151. Id. at 263, 425 P.2d at 225, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 625. See also, Reich, Midnight Welfare
Searches and the Social Security Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963).
152. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11250 (West Supp. 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
153. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320-1320.9 (West Supp. 1986).
154. Id. at § 11320.3(e)(1).
155. Id. at § 11310(b)(7).
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the importance of the parental presence in the home to both parent and
child.
Parents with children aged six to eleven may not want to place their
children in day care; they may have a legitimate concern for the effect
day care may have upon their children's development.1 5 6 Parents may
additionally fear that their children will be abused in child care centers.
Such fears are not unwarranted: the public's concern with sexual abuse
in day care centers has led to calls for legislation in California,157 as well
as widespread distrust of day care centers.15
Under the GAIN regulations, parents must place their children in
child care facilities whose fees fall within the "regional market rate,"
which is defined as "costing no more than 1.5 market standard deviations
above the mean cost of care for that region."' 59 Parents are therefore
limited in their choice of child care providers. The parents must utilize
the best care the state offers instead of the best care the parent chooses
which, in many cases, would be the parent rather than the day care
center.
Older children left unattended while their parents are at work might
also cause parents concern for their children's well-being. Children left
alone at home after school are frequently referred to as "latchkey
kids."' 60 Parents have reason for concern about the loneliness, boredom,
and safety risks their children may face. 161 A recent study reported that
156. See Belsky & Steinberg, Effects of Day Care, ANN. PROGRESS IN CHILD PSYCH. &
CHILD DEV., 576 (1979):
To an overwhelming degree, research on day care has been conducted in university-
based or university-connected centers with high staff-child ratios and well-designed
programs directed at fostering cognitive, emotional, and social development. Yet,
most of the day care available to the nation's parents is certainly not of this type and
may not be of this quality .... [Ifn the only study to date assessing the quality of day
care (Keyserling 1972), the majority of non-profit and, especially, of proprietary cen-
ters were judged inferior.
Id. at 578-79; see also, Etaugh, Effects of Maternal Employment on Children, 10 FAMILY
THERAPY COLLECTIONS 16 (1984); Cherry & Eaton, Physical and Cognitive Development in
Children of Low Income Mothers Working in Child's Early Years, 48 CHILD DEV. 158 (1977);
Dunlop, Maternal Employment & Child Care, 12 PROF. PSYCHOLOGY 67 (1981); Meredith,
The Nine-to-Five Dilemma, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Feb. 1986, at 36.
157. California Child Day Care Facilities Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.70-
1596.893 (West Supp. 1986). Two of the main purposes of this legislation are to increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of child care licensing, and to enhance consumer awareness. Id. at
§ 1596.736.
158. See, e.g., Watson, A Hidden Epidemic, NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 30; Beck, An
Epidemic of Child Abuse, NEWSWEEK, August 20, 1984, at 44; "Brutalized"--Sex Charges at
a Nursery, TIME, April 2, 1984, at 21; Elshtain, Invasion of the Child Savers, PROGRESSIVE,
Sept. 1985, at 23.
159. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11320.3(f) (West Supp. 1986).
160. L. LONG & T. LONG, THE HANDBOOK FOR LATCHKEY CHILDREN AND THEIR PAR-
ENTS 17 (1983). See also Overview of SB 303, supra note 98, at 1.
161. See, e.g., Helping Latchkey Children, CHILDREN TODAY, Sept.- Oct. 1985, at 2 ("Un-
attended children need to learn to act responsibly to emergencies and other important life
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these children are also more likely to experiment with sex than are other
children their age. 16z Teenage pregnancy, while dangerous for society as
a whole, is especially hazardous to children of welfare recipients. The
children may feel even more trapped within the circle of poverty if they
believe that once they become pregnant, their only option will be to drop
out of school and go on welfare.
In addition to these concerns about the negative effects on day care
children and of children left home alone, parents may also have a legiti-
mate interest in spending time with their children, supervising their ac-
tivities, and participating in their development. This participation,
which helps strengthen family bonds, is jeopardized by GAIN's compul-
sory requirements.
1 63
All of these concerns demonstrate that the GAIN legislation denies
parents important choices in raising their children. GAIN interferes
with the parents' rights by forcing them to place younger children in day
care, and leave older children unattended, with all of the resulting
problems. GAIN's compulsory nature infringes on the parents' funda-
mental right to control and guide their children's upbringing, as estab-
lished under both federal and state law."' A voluntary program would
preserve the parents' control over their children's upbringing.
V. Fundamental Right Versus Compelling State Interest
California's primary goal behind the GAIN legislation is to perma-
nently remove present recipients from welfare rolls and to save money
for the state through reduced welfare costs. 165 Thus, the state's interest
is primarily in economic savings. The other goals California asserts'
66
are considered part of the state's primary goal of economic savings, since
in actuality, they result from the Legislature's desire to save the taxpay-
ers' money, and do not comprise separate state interests. Since the fun-
damental right of privacy is involved, regulations limiting this right must
be narrowly drawn and may only be justified by a "compelling state
situations."); Galambos & Garbarino, Identifying the Missing Links in the Study of Latchkey
Children, CHILDREN TODAY, July-Aug. 1983, at 2; Guerney & Moore, Phone-Friend A Pre-
vention-Oriented Service for Latchkey Children, CHILDREN TODAY, July-Aug. 1983, at 5;
Scherer, The Loneliness of the Latchkey Child, INSTRUCTOR, May 1982 at 38; Campbell &
Flake, Latchkey Children-What is the Answer?, CLEARINGHOUSE, May 1985, at 381; Well-
born, When School Kids Come Home to An Empty House, U.S. NEW & WORLD REPORT, Sept.
14, 1981, at 42.
162. Latchkey Kids Likely to Try Sex, Study Says, San Francisco Chron., Nov. 25, 1985, at
61, col. 3.
163. It is true that parents and children who are not receiving AFDC may face similar
problems. However, because of different financial conditions, families not receiving AFDC
benefits may have more options available to them than do AFDC families.
164. See supra notes 101-141 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 37.




In Darces v. Wood,' 68 the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of fiscal integrity as a compelling interest. Darces involved the
state's refusal to take the needs of undocumented alien children into ac-
count in determining AFDC benefits.169 The state argued that fiscal con-
cerns prevented it from providing benefits to undocumented alien
children.' 70 The court ruled, however, that the "[p]reservation of the fisc
is an insufficient justification" under heightened scrutiny, 17 1 and there-
fore fiscal concerns will not outweigh a fundamental constitutional right.
In reaching its decision, the California Supreme Court relied upon
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Plyer v. Doe.17 2 In that
case, Texas sought to withhold from school districts any state funds for
the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the
United States.'73 The Plyer Court held that "the preservation of re-
sources standing alone can hardly justify the classification used in allo-
cating those resources."1 74 Therefore, California's overriding interest in
reducing welfare costs through the GAIN program is not compelling
enough to overcome its infringement of the parent's constitutional right
of privacy.
Additionally, the GAIN statute itself is not narrowly tailored to
achieve the state's goals without violating AFDC recipients' right of pri-
vacy, because it requires compulsory, rather than voluntary, participa-
tion by those persons not exempt. 175 If the program were made
voluntary, the state's interest in economic savings could still be
achieved,1 76 yet the participant's constitutional rights would remain un-
affected because it would allow parents to choose their method of child
rearing. Also, early workfare commentators stated that compulsory pro-
grams did not achieve their stated goals. 17 7 Thus, it is the compulsory
nature of GAIN that violates the constitutionally protected right of
privacy.
In addition to the constitutional problems raised by GAIN, certain
negative components of the original WIN program are also present in the
California plan. 7 Since parents are forced to work outside the home,
167. See supra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
168. 35 Cal. 3d 871, 679 P.2d 458, 201 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1984).
169. Id. at 875, 679 P. 2d at 460, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
170. Id. at 894, 679 P.2d at 473, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
171. Id.
172. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
173. Id. at 205.
174. Id. at 227 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1971)).
175. See supra note 50-52 and accompanying text.
176. Massachusetts' WIN Demo program was voluntary, and saved the state approxi-
mately $50 million over a two-year period. Kirp, supra note 32.
177. Note, Compulsory Work, supra note 5, at 213.
178. See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.
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and children are often left alone or in daycare centers, some families may
be affected in a way contrary to the stated purposes of the AFDC pro-
gram. 179 Also, a compulsory program forces people into the labor mar-
ket by intimidation, rather than of their own accord. 18
The authors of GAIN conscientiously attempted to address the
shortcomings of other states' WIN Demo programs.'" However, Cali-
fornia's program could be made constitutional, and otherwise further
strengthened, if it were voluntary. If GAIN was made voluntary, there
would be no infringement on participants' right of privacy, since parents
would be able to choose to stay at home, place their children in day care
centers, or leave their children at home. Additionally, the degrading as-
pects that compulsion implies would not be present: recipients would be
able to take pride in their accomplishments and acquire skills which
would allow them to be responsible and independent members of society,
free from the dictates of the state.
Conclusion
California's new "workfare" legislation, GAIN, infringes upon
AFDC recipients' right of privacy to choose how to rear their children.
The right of privacy is a fundamental right that protects individuals from
unwarranted governmental intrusion without a compelling state interest.
The GAIN legislation intrudes upon the recipients' right of privacy by
making participation compulsory. This forces parents to place children
in day care or leave them home alone, and thus deprives parents of the
fundamental right to choose how to rear their children. The state's inter-
est in this legislation is in economic savings, which does not constitute a
compelling interest justifying the infringement. No compelling state in-
terest exists to justify this infringement. The legislation is unconstitu-
tional because it invades the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment and the right of privacy under federal and state
constitutions.
The authors of the GAIN legislation acknowledge that recipients of
aid "desire to work, and will do so if provided with the opportunity." '82
Compulsory programs are not successful at helping participants achieve
freedom from welfare."l 3 Making California's program voluntary would
not only avoid denying AFDC recipients their constitutional rights, but
would conclusively establish what the California legislators are asserting:
179. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
182. CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 11320(a).(West Supp. 1986).
183. Note, Compulsory Work, supra note 172.
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that given the training, preparation, and necessary support services, most
welfare recipients would choose work over welfare.
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